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Abstract 
 
We compare the concepts underlying modern actuarial solutions to pension insurance and 
present two recently developed pension products – pooled annuity overlay funds (based on 
actuarial fairness) and equitable income tontines (based on equitability). The two products 
adopt specific approaches to the management of longevity risk by mutualizing it among 
participants rather than transferring it completely to the insurer. As the market would appear 
to be ready for such innovations, our study seeks to establish a general framework for their 
introduction. We stress that the notion of actuarial fairness, which characterizes pooled 
annuity overlay funds, enables participants to join and exit the fund at any time. Such freedom 
of action is a quite remarkable feature and one that cannot be matched by lifelong contracts.  
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1. Introduction and motivation 
 
Annuity providers face systematic longevity risk and are obliged, therefore, to set aside 
solvency capital and to pay reinsurance premiums. In the current environment of low interest 
rates this means that annuitants receive lower annuities than they did in the past, which in turn 
impacts financial decisions for retirement, lowering the overall appetite for annuity projects 
(see, among others, Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). Despite the demand from pension providers, 
the market for longevity risk is limited (see, Lin and Cox, 2005, and Chan et al., 2016, among 
many others). Given this state of affairs, an interesting new stream has emerged in the 
academic literature that adopts a different focus to annuities by pooling longevity risk among 
participating pensioners. Some of these products take their inspiration from ideas similar to 
those employed by Lorenzo di Tonti in the seventeenth century (see, Milevsky, 2015). A lump 
sum payment gave the right to an annuity and this lifelong pension increased over time, as the 
yields were increasingly distributed among a smaller number of surviving beneficiaries. 
Likewise, modern tontine-type annuity products reduce longevity risk for the companies 
providing them, and they can therefore be offered to customers at a lower cost (see, Donnelly 
2015).  
 
The inception of this new class of pension scheme is receiving, and seems likely to attract 
much more, attention in the academic literature as well as in the market, with many insurers 
keen to explore innovations in retirement products. Weinert and Gründl (2016) are in favour 
of tontinizing some fraction of the individual retirement wealth on the individual lifetime 
utility, considering an increasing liquidity-need at old ages.  
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In this paper we consider a few examples of this new class of pension product and outline 
some of their respective similarities and differences. In so doing, we show that there are 
fundamental concepts in the definition of these products that deserve closer attention. A 
survey of the methods employed and a new general framework for these pension products are 
fundamental for future developments in this rapidly growing area of pension insurance. 
 
 
2. Description 
 
We analyse pooled annuity overlay funds and equitable retirement income tontines by 
comparing two recent actuarial approaches to eliminating the longevity risk management 
constraints of the annuity business. We do so by comparing the respective contributions of 
Donnelly et al. (2014) and Milevsky and Salisbury (2016). The basic concept underpinning 
both approaches is the pooling of the wealth of individuals (and, hence, their mortality risk) as 
opposed to individuals investing separately in the pension products provided by an insurer. 
Both approaches have a similar starting point insofar as they modify an existing product in 
order to treat all participants equally.  
 
To formalize this concept of equality, Donnelly et al. (2014) introduced the notion of 
actuarial fairness, that is, if the expected actuarial gains (i.e., the benefits expected from 
participating minus the initial investment) are zero and this holds for all participants, then the 
product is deemed ‘actuarially fair’. In other words, no single participant subsidizes or 
benefits from the other participants. Milevsky and Salisbury (2016) introduced their slightly 
weaker condition of equitability, that is, if the expected benefits, measured in terms of per 
dollar of initial investment, are equal for all participants then the product is deemed 
‘equitable’. By definition, ‘fairness’ implies ‘equitability’, since the expected benefits per 
dollar of initial investment would be equal to exactly one dollar for all participants. However, 
the reverse implication does not hold. Thus, while equitability means that the expected 
benefits are equal for all participants, they might still be lower than the initial investment 
made. Hence, the expected actuarial gain would be less than zero, whereas for fairness to hold 
the actuarial gain needs to be zero. Below we compare the two potential products based on 
this reasoning. 
 
2.1.The pooled annuity overlay fund 
 
Although Donnelly et al.’s (2014) pooled annuity overlay fund includes the word annuity, the 
concept is quite distinct from that of a standard life annuity. It does not, for example, transfer 
the risk of mortality to a third party (insurer), nor does it guarantee the pensioner a fixed 
payout stream (until death). Yet, it does seek to overcome the problems inherent to a life 
annuity, including its lack of transparency as regards costs (and, hence, the fairness of the 
proposed price) and the irreversibility of a lifelong contract, which is its most notable 
characteristic. The goal of Donnelly et al. (2014) is to propose a new kind of pooled annuity 
fund that is transparent in its costs, actuarially fair and which guarantees the investment 
freedom of each individual in addition to the heterogeneity of the group.  
 
Let us begin by examining the pooled annuity fund proposed by Stamos (2008). This product 
pools the wealth and mortality risk of a homogeneous group of individuals (i.e., same age, 
same mortality rate and same initial investment). Whenever one of the individuals in the fund 
dies, their wealth is redistributed among the surviving participants in proportion to their 
current wealth. Stamos’ (2008) contribution is to derive the optimal continuous-time payout 
structure (or consumption) and the optimal portfolio choice. Donnelly et al. (2014) introduce a 
Comentario [IR1]: Not in references?? 
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generalisation of this pooled annuity fund, which they refer to as the pooled annuity overlay 
fund. The idea can be simply explained: for a specified amount of time, individuals pool their 
wealth, but if one participant should die during this period their wealth is redistributed among 
the survivors and the participant that has died (i.e., a part of the money is left as a bequest to 
his descendants). The amount redistributed to each individual is proportional to the initial 
wealth invested and their rate of mortality. At the end of the specified period, the pool is 
dissolved. Note that in theory the pooled annuity overlay fund operates on an instantaneous 
basis rather than over a long time period. A key feature of the product is that it is actuarially 
fair at every instant in time (Proposition 3.1 in Donnelly et al., 2014). The advantages of 
actuarial fairness are manifold: first, it is possible to exit the fund at any given time (given 
that the expected actuarial gains are zero, an individual can exit the fund simply by 
withdrawing their money); and, second, no group of individuals profits financially at the 
expense of another group and so individuals with different demographics can join the pool 
without any restriction. 
 
As the pooled annuity overlay fund allows individuals to decide how they want to invest their 
wealth on the financial market, overall financial gains depend on their risk preferences. 
Donnelly et al. (2014) report extensive numerical simulations to illustrate how the 
performance of a pooled annuity overlay fund compares to that of a mortality-linked fund (as 
introduced by Donnelly et al., 2013). The latter is similar in many respects to a pooled annuity 
fund, insofar as the participants also pool their wealth but in this instance the insurer (or the 
seller of the product), as opposed to the participants, bears the volatility of mortality. As a 
result, the participants obtain a deterministic, mortality-linked interest rate (that is 
proportional to their mortality rate) instead of redistributing the wealth of the deceased 
participants among the survivors. However, upon their death the participants lose their money 
(to the fund). While the pooled annuity overlay fund has two sources of volatility (that of the 
financial market and of mortality), the mortality-linked fund is volatile only as regards the 
members’ investments in the financial market. A comparison of the two products shows that 
the use of a pooled annuity overlay fund can be advantageous, since for the same volatility as 
in the mortality-linked fund a higher expected return can be achieved with a moderately 
heterogeneous pooled annuity overlay fund of just a few hundred members (Donnelly et al., 
2014). 
 
2.2.The income tontine 
 
The second actuarial product we examine is the optimal retirement income tontine developed 
by Milevsky and Salisbury (2016). The income tontine is very different from the pooled 
annuity fund: first, because the value of the lifelong payments made to the group of tontine 
participants (the payout) is deterministic and, second, because the whole lifecycle has to be 
considered as the timeframe. However, the product employs a similar idea to the product 
developed by Donnelly et al. (2014) insofar as it distributes the payout in relation to the 
individual’s wealth and a share price (that usually depends on the mortality rate). 
 
To understand the idea presented by Milevsky and Salisbury (2016), we need to go back and 
examine the original concept of the tontine annuity, whereby a group of individuals invested 
the same amount of money in the financial product. In exchange, a regular dividend payout 
was made to survivors until the last participant died. According to Milevsky and Salisbury 
(2016), the mechanism can be seen as “a perpetual (i.e., infinite maturity) bond that is 
purchased from an issuer by a group of investors who agree to share periodic coupons only 
amongst survivors”. Clearly, this classical concept implied a transfer of wealth from the old to 
the young. Imagine two individuals, one old and one young, investing an equal amount in this 
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perpetual bond. As the elder of the two is likely to die first, the expected actuarial gains of the 
younger individual will be higher than those of the older participant, which makes this 
agreement actuarially unfair. Milevsky and Salisbury (2016), in contrast, adapt the classical 
tontine (in a fashion similar to Donnelly et al., 2014, when working with the pooled annuity 
fund) and introduce equitable tontines, i.e., tontines where all the participants have the same 
expected benefits. 
 
However, it should be stressed that Milevsky and Salisbury’s (2016) setup differs from that of 
the pooled annuity overlay fund in a variety of ways. First, as stated, they focus solely on 
lifetime income, which means that the timeframe is fixed to the whole lifecycle. This also 
means that individuals can neither enter nor exit the equitable tontine once it has been set in 
motion. Furthermore, modern tontines offer the prospects of a deterministic rule (in special 
cases near constant) payout in contrast to Donnelly et al.’s (2014) product, while they do not 
provide the possibility of making a bequest. All the wealth is distributed solely among the 
surviving participants (i.e., no part of the fund is set aside for recently deceased participants). 
Finally, in this case the management of the pooled investment is external and, thus, likely to 
be costly. 
 
 
3. Notation and models 
 
Having briefly introduced the main features of the models, we now describe them more 
formally. Let us assume we have a group with 𝑛 participants. We can then split this group into 
𝑀 homogeneous subgroups each with 𝑛𝑖 participants so that ∑𝑛𝑖 = 𝑛. The homogeneity of 
these subgroups is reflected in the fact that their members have the same age, wealth, risk 
preference and mortality characteristics. This means each participant in a subgroup 𝑘 has the 
same rate of mortality 𝜆𝑡
𝑘 and wealth 𝑊𝑡
𝑘. Note that this mortality rate and wealth refer to an 
instant in time t.  
 
In the pooled annuity overlay fund all members of the same subgroup have the same risk 
preferences with regards to investment, which means that their wealth allocation strategy in 
response to a riskless and a risky asset is invariable throughout the subgroup. The main 
question that remains unanswered is how actuarial gains can be accumulated. As this occurs 
on a continuous basis, let us specify an instant in time (𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡) for this. The wealth of each 
individual that dies in this short period of time is placed in the so-called notional mortality 
account. This amount is then shared among those who remained alive at time 𝑡, as well as 
those that died within the period (𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡). The crucial point is that in the pooled annuity 
overlay fund the allocation is proportional to the wealth invested 𝑊𝑡
𝑘 by the individual and his 
mortality rate 𝜆𝑡
𝑘 at (𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡), i.e., each individual receives the following proportion of the 
overall amount in the notional mortality account: 
 
𝜆𝑡
𝑘𝑊𝑡
𝑘
∑ 𝑊𝑡
𝑚𝜆𝑡
𝑚𝐿𝑡
𝑚𝑀
𝑚=1
 
where 𝐿𝑡
𝑚 is the number of people alive at time 𝑡 in subgroup m, i.e., including those that died 
in (𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡). 
 
Likewise, when we consider a tontine-type product, we assume a group with 𝑛 participants 
and 𝑀 homogeneous subgroups (or as Milevsky and Salisbury (2016) call them: cohorts) each 
with 𝑛𝑖 participants so that ∑𝑛𝑖 = 𝑛. The subgroups are homogenous in that their members 
are of the same age and have the same initial wealth to invest (i.e., at time 𝑡 = 0 denoted by 
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𝑊0
𝑘). To avoid the actuarial unfairness of the classical tontines, Milevsky and Salisbury 
(2016) introduce the price per share 
1
𝜋𝑖
 for a subgroup i. Thus, based on their wealth and other 
factors such as age (i.e., force of mortality), the individuals in the different subgroups are 
required to pay a different price per share and, hence, they acquire a different number of 
shares respectively. The overall payout is determined by the total amount initially invested by 
the group multiplied by the deterministic payout function 𝑑(𝑡) that governs the payout per 
initial dollar invested. Recall that the payout function 𝑑(𝑡) is continuous and so is the payout, 
i.e., payouts are not only made when an individual dies. As such, the proportion of the overall 
payout for each living individual is given by the amount of shares held with respect to the sum 
of the shares of the survivors. This means a known overall amount is paid out to a decreasing 
number of surviving individuals.  
 
In contrast to the pooled annuity overlay fund proposed by Donnelly et al. (2014), this 
tontine-like product cannot be actuarially fair. Yet, the explicit structure of this tontine 
depends on the specification of the payout rate 𝑑(𝑡) and the price per share for each subgroup 
1
𝜋𝑖
. Milevsky and Salisbury (2016) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
existence of an equitable tontine for a given payout function 𝑑(𝑡) (Milevsky and Salisbury, 
2016, Theorem 4). This means they provide conditions for share prices to exist so that the 
tontine is equitable. As they explain, intuitively their theorem states an equivalent condition to 
the non-existence of equitable share prices: If share prices exist such that a subgroup finds this 
tontine favourable, even though they only get paid after all individuals from another subgroup 
have died, then share prices which make this tontine equitable do not exist. 
 
Recall that equitability, unlike actuarial fairness, means that a participant can expect a small 
actuarial loss, but at least this does not discriminate any subgroup. Milevsky and Salisbury 
(2016) claim this is an acceptable property in return for having a simple, transparent product 
with a deterministic payout function. However, note that as participation in a pooled annuity 
overlay fund can be reconsidered at any moment in time, pensioners therefore also have the 
freedom to design their own investment decisions, that is, they can reduce the investment 
amount in order to obtain the other part as a payout. In other words, members can join or exit 
the pool as they wish, and they can also reconsider their reinvestment decisions and, so, 
reduce a proportion of their wealth according to a certain payout structure,  
 
Let’s consider a number of different examples of tontines as presented in Milevsky and 
Salisbury (2016). First, consider the so-called proportional tontine. Here, the price per share 
(for each subgroup) equals the price that an individual in this subgroup has to pay for a 
standard annuity which pays 1$ for the rest of his life. Further, the payout function 𝑑(𝑡) is 
proportional to the mean number of surviving tontine shares. This tontine is only equitable in 
the limit, i.e., for an infinitely sized group. Also, it is optimal in the limit as shown in 
Milevsky and Salisbury (2016, Theorem 6). This means that (for a strictly concave utility 
function) the utility of each subgroup is optimized simultaneously.  
 
A generalisation of the proportional tontine is the so-called natural tontine where the payout 
function has to be proportional to the mean number of surviving tontine shares, but no 
specification about the share prices are made. They are referred to as ‘natural’ by Milevsky 
and Salisbury (2016) because it seems a natural requirement to the payout function to have 
this proportionality. The natural tontine equals the proportional tontine in the limit (and thus is 
asymptotically optimal). To have not only natural but also, as desired, equitable tontines, we 
have to compute simultaneously share prices 
1
𝜋𝑖
 for each subgroup i and the payout function 
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𝑑(𝑡). This problem can be a computational challenge in practice. As mentioned, there exist 
necessary and sufficient conditions with regard to a tontine for the existence of equitable 
prices (which are then unique up to a multiplicative constant). But in the case of natural 
tontines, to date this remains a mere conjecture of Milevsky and Salisbury (2016). This makes 
proportional tontines, although not equitable, easier to use, at least from a practical point of 
view. Milevsky and Salisbury (2016, p.18) argue: “Though the theoretical basis of 
proportional tontines is not as appealing as that of natural ones, they are simpler to compute, 
and they do appear to perform reasonably well in practice.” Thus, they see proportional 
tontines as “acceptable alternatives” in cases when the computation of a natural equitable 
tontine is too difficult. 
 
To conclude this section, we provide a summary overview of the differences and similarities 
of the two products (see Table 1): 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of the properties of a pooled annuity overlay fund and an income tontine 
 Pooled annuity overlay fund Income tontine 
 
Pool of members  
 
Open (join and abandon 
fund at any time) 
 
Closed 
Timeframe  Variable Over lifetime only 
Payout Stochastic (only when 
member dies) 
Deterministic and continuous payout 
rate 
Distribution of 
payout 
According to wealth and 
rate of mortality 
Among surviving and 
recently deceased members  
According to amount of shares 
(determined by wealth and share 
price) 
Among surviving members  
Actuarially fair Yes No 
Equitable Yes (given that it is 
actuarially fair) 
Sufficient and necessary conditions 
exist 
Entity guaranteeing 
a fixed income for 
life 
Does not exist Does not exist 
 
 
4. A general framework 
 
A comparison of the characteristics of the two products is of obvious interest to the sector and 
should shed provide us with a more complete understanding of them. To be able to compare a 
pooled annuity overlay fund and an equitable tontine, we first have to modify the 
redistribution of wealth in the former so that it is only redistributed among surviving 
members. 
 
The way to achieve this can be outlined as follows. For a given instant of time (𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡), we 
assume that the k-th person died within this time interval and that his wealth 𝑊𝑡
𝑘 is to be 
redistributed (recall that in the standard setting a certain fraction is withheld for the bequest of 
the deceased). We wish to find the factor (1 + 𝐴𝑡
𝑘  ) by which we have to increase the wealth 
𝑊𝑡
𝑘 of this person so that the amount redistributed among all surviving members is exactly 
equal to the initial wealth 𝑊𝑡
𝑘of the k-th person. In other words, the new total amount 
(1 + 𝐴𝑡
𝑘  ) 𝑊𝑡
𝑘 minus the proportion corresponding to the deceased member must equal the 
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initial amount 𝑊𝑡
𝑘. As we are unable to determine in advance the subgroup in which a 
member will die, we need to impose this condition for all subgroups 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑀. As such, 
the following formula should hold: 
 
𝑊𝑡
𝑘(1 + 𝐴𝑡
𝑘  ) − 𝑊𝑡
𝑘(1 + 𝐴𝑡
𝑘 ) 
𝜆𝑡
𝑘𝑊𝑡
𝑘(1 + 𝐴𝑡
𝑘 )
∑ 𝑊𝑡
𝑚𝜆𝑡
𝑚𝐿𝑡
𝑚(1 + 𝐴𝑡
𝑚)
𝑀
𝑚=1
= 𝑊𝑡
𝑘 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑀 (1) 
 
 
This can be rewritten as: 
𝐴𝑡
𝑘  =  
𝜆𝑡
𝑘𝑊𝑡
𝑘 (1 + 𝐴𝑡
𝑘)
∑ 𝑊𝑡
𝑚𝜆𝑡
𝑚𝐿𝑡
𝑚(1 + 𝐴𝑡
𝑚) − 𝜆𝑡
𝑘𝑊𝑡
𝑘 (1 + 𝐴𝑡
𝑘)
𝑀
𝑚=1
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑀              (2) 
 
In equation (2), the denominator consists of the sum (according to the mortality rate) of the 
weighted wealth of the members alive at time 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡, i.e., all except the k-th person. To 
compute the 𝐴𝑡
𝑘 , we fix a starting value 𝐴𝑡
𝑘,0
and propose an iterative procedure to determine 
the final value: 
𝐴𝑡
𝑘,0 =  
𝜆𝑡
𝑘𝑊𝑡
𝑘 
∑ 𝑊𝑡
𝑚𝜆𝑡
𝑚𝐿𝑡
𝑚 − 𝜆𝑡
𝑘𝑊𝑡
𝑘 
𝑀
𝑚=1
, 
𝐴𝑡
𝑘,ℎ =  
𝜆𝑡+𝑑𝑡
𝑘 𝑊𝑡
𝑘 (1 + 𝐴𝑡
𝑘,ℎ−1)
∑ 𝑊𝑡
𝑚𝜆𝑡
𝑚𝐿𝑡
𝑚(1 + 𝐴𝑡
𝑚,ℎ−1) − 𝜆𝑡
𝑘𝑊𝑡
𝑘 (1 + 𝐴𝑡
𝑘,ℎ−1)
𝑀
𝑚=1
, 
for a positive natural number h, indicating the iterations. 
 
By using this procedure, we can ensure that the entire wealth of the deceased 𝑊𝑡
𝑘 is 
redistributed among the surviving members. Thus, instead of considering the pooled annuity 
overlay fund with initial wealth 𝑊𝑡
𝑘 for 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑀, we consider the pooled annuity overlay 
fund with initial wealth 𝑊𝑡
𝑘 (1 + 𝐴𝑡
𝑘  ) for each 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑀. Then, equation (1) ensures that 
the wealth of the deceased 𝑊𝑡
𝑘 is redistributed among the surviving members. 
 
From a technical point of view, this solution is viable only if one member dies at the given 
instant in time. In practice, if more than one member dies during the time interval considered 
(e.g., a day), the algorithm would have to be applied separately and consecutively, ordering 
the deaths by descending age of the deceased. 
 
 
5. Illustration 
 
We are now in a position to compare the actuarial mechanisms of the pooled annuity overlay 
fund (Donnelly et al., 2014) and the equitable scheme (Milevsky and Salisbury, 2016) by 
considering a simple example. While the setup for the pooled annuity overlay fund is fully 
specified, we need more precise details regarding the tontine being used. By selecting the 
payout function 𝑑(𝑡) and the price per share 
1
𝜋𝑖
 for each subgroup, we can fully specify the 
Milevsky and Salisbury (2016) tontine and determine if it is equitable or not. As discussed 
above, Milevsky and Salisbury (2016) recognised that a proportional tontine can be 
considered instead of a natural and equitable one and it will “perform reasonably well in 
practice”. So, for the sake of simplicity, we consider a proportional tontine. 
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Imagine a single man with an initial wealth of 100$, aged 65 and a mortality rate of 0.99. He 
wishes to join a homogeneous pool of 99 people (i.e., n=100) also aged 65, with the same 
mortality rate (i.e., 0.99) and who each have an initial wealth of 10$. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume the risk-free interest rate to be r= 0% (we thereby avoid the effect of 
returns resulting from investing wealth with fixed returns).  
 
To illustrate a cumulative payout, we consider different instants in time (1, 5, 10, 20 and 30 
years). For these instants, we examine different cases: first, we consider the payout in the case 
that none of the members dies. Second, we consider likely outcomes in a cohort of 65-year-
olds (although of course these can be accommodated to other situations). Here, we consider 
one death after one year, two deaths after five years, five deaths after ten years, eleven deaths 
after twenty years and thirty deaths after thirty years. We also consider highly unlikely 
outcomes for a cohort purchasing an annuity tontine at the age of 65. Hence, we consider five 
deaths after one year, ten deaths after five years, twenty-five deaths after ten years, fifty 
deaths after twenty years and ninety deaths after thirty years, which would be considerably 
more deaths than any reasonable mortality table would indicate for a modern society. 
 
Table 2 records the cumulative payout for the single person (with 100$ initial wealth) and 
Table 3 shows the cumulative payout for the other investors (with 10$ initial wealth) in the 
case that they survive. 
 
Calculating the cumulative payouts 
 
As discussed, two choices have to be made concerning the tontine: namely, the payout 
function 𝑑(𝑡) and the price per share 
1
𝜋𝑖
 for each subgroup. In a proportional tontine, the price 
per share equals the price that has to be paid to obtain a standard annuity of 1$ for life. As we 
know, this price depends on the age of the members in the corresponding subgroup. Given 
that in our example all the participants are of the same age (in both subgroups), the price per 
share  
1
𝜋𝑖
 is the same for all participants (15.02$). Note that we have used the Society of 
Actuaries’ (2008) mortality table available in R package lifecontingencies (Spedicato, 2013). 
 
In a proportional tontine, the payout function 𝑑(𝑡) (per initial dollar of investment) is a 
weighted sum of the annuity factors (the inverse of the price for the standard annuity of 1$ per 
life) for each subgroup. Given that in our example the prices were the same across all 
subgroups, the payout function 𝑑(𝑡) at time 𝑡 simplifies to the product of the survival function 
for a 65-year-old individual surviving 𝑡 years, 𝑝𝑡 65, and the annuity factor for a 65-year-old,  
1
𝑎65
 where 𝑎65 is the price for a standard annuity of 1$ for life for a 65-year-old: 
𝑑(𝑡) = 𝑝𝑡 65 ∗  
1
𝑎65
 
For example, the payout rate after one year is 𝑑(1) = 0.978 ∗  
1
15.02
 = 0.065 per initial dollar 
invested. Then, the overall payout at one year is the initial total wealth multiplied by the 
payout rate: 𝑑(1) ∗ (1 ∗ 100 + 99 ∗ 10 ) = 71.01.  
 
This amount is redistributed among the surviving participants according to the shares held. As 
the share prices are equal in both subgroups, this is equivalent to a distribution made 
according to the proportion of the initial investment made. 
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If no one dies, the single man with the greatest initial wealth would receive 
100
100+99∗10
=
9.17% of the total payout, and each of the other participants would receive 
10
100+99∗10
=
0.92%, i.e., as the former invested ten times more than the latter, he would likewise receive 
ten times more. Multiplying these percentages with the overall payout we obtain the first 
number in the first rows of Tables 2 and 3, respectively. 
 
If a member dies, the same overall amount is distributed among all surviving members 
according to the remaining shares. Note that which person dies makes a difference.  
 
If the single man with the greatest initial wealth (i.e., 100$) dies, the overall amount paid out 
after 1 year, 71.01$, is redistributed equally among the remaining 99 members people (given 
that they all made the same initial investment), i.e., 71.01$ ∶ 99 = 0.717 which equals 7.17% 
of their initial investment of 10$ (see the first value in the fourth row of Table 2). 
 
If, on the other hand, one of the members with a 10$ initial investment dies, the percentages 
change only slightly (in comparison to the scenario in which all the members survive). Thus, 
the single man with the greatest initial wealth would receive 
100
100+98∗10
= 9.26% and each of 
the other survivors would receive 
10
100+98∗10
= 0.93%. Accordingly, the difference between 
the first and second values in the second column of each table is not very great.   
 
 
Table 2: Cumulative payout (as a percentage of capital invested) over the years for the wealthy 
investor (initial wealth of 100$) for a proportional tontine assuming Society of Actuaries’ mortality 
table to calculate price per share and all the wealth invested at the outset to buy shares. 
 
 Time 
Events In 1 year In 5 years In 10 years In 20 years In 30 years 
No death 6.52 30.96 57.06 90.18 99.45 
Likely event 
(1 death in one year, 2 deaths 
in 5 years, etc.) and the 
wealthy investor does not die 
6.58 31.06 57.29 90.42 99.55 
Likely event 
(1 death in one year, 2 deaths 
in 5 years, etc.)  and one of 
the deceased is the wealthy 
investor 
0 25.11 52.29 88.10 99.19 
Highly unlikely event 
(5 deaths in one year, 10 
deaths in 5 years, etc.) and 
the wealthy investor does not 
die 
6.83 31.55 58.48 91.95 100.70 
Highly unlikely event 
(1 death in one year, 2 deaths 
in 5 years, etc.)  and one of 
the deceased is the wealthy 
investor 
0 25.11 52.29 88.10 99.19 
 
 
 
 
 
Comentario [IR2]: ?? Is this right? 
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Table 3: Cumulative payout (as a percentage of capital invested) over the years for a 10$ initial 
investor for a proportional tontine assuming Society of Actuaries’ mortality table to calculate price 
per share and all the wealth invested at the outset to buy shares. 
 
 Time 
Events In 1 year In 5 years In 10 years In 20 years In 30 years 
No death 6.52 30.96 57.06 90.18 99.45 
Likely event 
(1 death in one year, 2 deaths 
in 5 years, etc.) and the 
wealthy investor does not die 
6.58 31.06 57.29 90.42 99.55 
Likely event 
(1 death in one year, 2 deaths 
in 5 years, etc.)  and one of 
the deceased is the wealthy 
investor 
7.17 31.61 57.76 90.65 99.60 
Highly unlikely event 
(5 deaths in one year, 10 
deaths in 5 years, etc.) and 
the wealthy investor does not 
die 
6.83 31.55 58.48 91.95 100.70 
Highly unlikely event 
(1 death in one year, 2 deaths 
in 5 years, etc.)  and one of 
the deceased is the wealthy 
investor 
7.48 32.19 59.22 92.64 102.06 
 
Both tables show that even after thirty years the initial investment of 100$ or 10$, 
respectively, has not been paid back (except in the case of the highly unlikely events after 
thirty years). It should be recalled that in the income tontine plan all members have to remain 
in the scheme, whereas in the case of the pooled annuity overlay fund participants are free to 
leave as and when they wish. This means that after an initial investment (let’s say 100$) in the 
pooled fund, a member can withdraw the exact same amount of wealth from it as he would 
receive as a payout from the proportional tontine (which is then accumulated in Tables 2 and 
3). Hence, one could replicate exactly the tontine payout structure and still have an amount 
left to further invest in the pooled annuity overlay fund.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We have analysed two new products – pooled funds as proposed by Donnelly et al. (2014) 
and income tontines as outlined by Milevsky and Salisbury (2016) – that pool longevity risk 
among participants. In line with Weinert and Grundl (2016), we feel there exist appropriate 
incentives for individuals to hold some fraction of their retirement wealth in these 
contemporary tontine products as opposed to the complete annuitization of their wealth. Yet, 
having said that, Weinert and Grundl’s (2016) analysis of consumer spending (drawing on 
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, 1984-2013) shows that an old-age 
liquidity-need function is concave and increasing with age. However, the requirements and 
circumstances of each pensioner make these budget needs highly specific and extremely 
difficult to specify in advance. As such, the possibilities of investment and participation 
provided by the pooled annuity overlay fund appear to be especially valuable, since they 
allow participants to adopt personalized strategies and to modify them in the de-accumulation 
phase, something that a predefined annuity fails to do. 
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The recent increase in published studies addressing this subject is indicative of the interest in 
pension insurance in a very broad sense in all countries. To mention just a few, Huang and 
Milevsky (2016) analyse the retirement consumption problem with differentially taxed 
accounts of retirees, showing how Canadians de-accumulate financial wealth during 
retirement. Huang et al. (2016) turn their focus on optimal purchasing of deferred income 
annuities. The authors assume a mean-reverting model for payout yields and show that a risk-
neutral consumer who wishes to maximize his expected retirement income should wait until 
yields reach a threshold (which lies above historical averages) and then purchase the deferred 
income annuity in one lump sum. Denuit et al. (2015) propose that the length of the deferment 
period could be subject to revision, providing longevity-contingent deferred life annuities and 
allowing for a dynamic decision process over time rather than having to make a choice 
immediately on retirement. Mikevsky and Salisbury (2015), in presenting optimal retirement 
income tontines, rekindle a debate about retirement income products that has long been 
neglected, and provide the mathematical finance tools to design the next generation of tontine 
annuities. Yet, note that Donnelly (2015) insists that actuarial unfairness cannot be referred to 
as solidarity given that there is no uncertainty as to who bears the expected losses resulting 
from the actuarial unfairness. She also examines other schemes, including the group self-
annuitization scheme proposed by Piggott et al. (2005) for any heterogeneous group of 
members which is not actuarially fair. In short, all these studies appear to be inspiring private 
pension providers to innovate and, we believe, they will be highly influential in the way 
longevity risk management will be addressed in the near future.  
 
It is self-evident that modern tontines and pooled funds can reduce both the insurer’s capital 
requirements and the safety loadings included in annuity prices, but just how substantial these 
reductions might be needs to be clarified by further research, since they will depend greatly 
on the marketing and uptake of these new products. In their study of enhanced annuities, 
Gatzert and Klotzki (2016) indicate that modern tontines and pooled funds are likely to come 
up against notable obstacles in the future, given consumers’ insufficient familiarity with the 
product, continuing hesitation on the part of distributors, and the general absence of interest 
among consumers for a lifelong annuity, which is in line with their underestimation of their 
own life expectancy. 
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